

Supersingular Isogeny Key Encapsulation

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
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TITLE	CITED BY	YEAR
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Isogeny

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

In mathematics, in particular, in algebraic geometry, an **isogeny** is a **morphism** of **algebraic groups** (a.k.a group varieties) that is **surjective** and has a finite **kernel**.

If the **groups** are **abelian varieties**, then any morphism $f: A \rightarrow B$ of the underlying algebraic varieties which is surjective with finite **fibres** is automatically an isogeny, provided that $f(1_A) = 1_B$. Such an isogeny f then provides a **group homomorphism** between the groups of k -valued points of A and B , for any **field** k over which f is defined.

The terms "isogeny" and "isogenous" come from the Greek word ισογενής , meaning "equal in kind or nature". The term "isogeny" was introduced by **Weil**; before this, the term "isomorphism" was somewhat confusingly used for what is now called an isogeny.

Overview of SIDH

1. Public parameters: Supersingular elliptic curve E over F .
2. Alice chooses a kernel $A \subset E$ and sends E/A to Bob.
3. Bob chooses a kernel $B \subset E$ and sends E/B to Alice.
4. The shared secret is

$$E/\langle A, B \rangle = (E/A)/\phi_A(B) = (E/B)/\phi_B(A).$$

$$\begin{array}{ccc} E & \xrightarrow{\phi_A} & E/A \\ \phi_B \downarrow & & \downarrow \\ E/B & \longrightarrow & E/\langle A, B \rangle \end{array}$$

Supersingular isogeny key exchange

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Supersingular isogeny Diffie–Hellman key exchange (SIDH) is a [post-quantum](#) cryptographic algorithm used to establish a secret key between two parties over an otherwise insecure communications channel. It is analogous to the [Diffie–Hellman key exchange](#), but is based on walks in a [supersingular isogeny graph](#) and is designed to resist [cryptanalytic attack](#) by an adversary in possession of a [quantum computer](#). SIDH boasts one of the smallest key sizes of all post-quantum key exchanges; with compression, SIDH uses 2688-bit^[1] public keys at a 128-bit quantum [security level](#). SIDH also distinguishes itself from similar systems such as [NTRU](#) and [Ring-LWE](#) by supporting [perfect forward secrecy](#), a property that prevents compromised long-term keys from compromising the confidentiality of old communication sessions. These properties make SIDH a natural candidate to replace [Diffie–Hellman](#) (DHE) and [elliptic curve Diffie–Hellman](#) (ECDHE), which are widely used in Internet communication.