


**THEOREM 5.8** *Suppose that  $p > 2$  is prime and  $\alpha \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*$ . Then  $\alpha$  is a primitive element modulo  $p$  if and only if  $\alpha^{(p-1)/q} \not\equiv 1 \pmod{p}$  for all primes  $q$  such that  $q \mid (p-1)$ .*

**PROOF** If  $\alpha$  is a primitive element modulo  $p$ , then  $\alpha^i \not\equiv 1 \pmod{p}$  for all  $i$  such that  $1 \leq i \leq p-2$ , so the result follows.

Conversely, suppose that  $\alpha \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*$  is not a primitive element modulo  $p$ . Let  $d$  be the order of  $\alpha$ . Then  $d \mid (p-1)$  by Lagrange's theorem, and  $d < p-1$  because  $\alpha$  is not primitive. Then  $(p-1)/d$  is an integer exceeding 1. Let  $q$  be a prime divisor of  $(p-1)/d$ . Then  $d$  is a divisor of the integer  $(p-1)/q$ . Since  $\alpha^d \equiv 1 \pmod{p}$  and  $d \mid (p-1)/q$ , it follows that  $\alpha^{(p-1)/q} \equiv 1 \pmod{p}$ . ■

$$2250 = 2 \cdot 3^2 \cdot 5^3$$

2251 prime



$\alpha$  primitive mod 2251

iff  $\alpha^{450} \neq 1 \wedge \alpha^{750} \neq 1 \wedge$

$\alpha^{1125} \neq 1 \pmod{2251}$

Thm 5.8 (Stinson):

**Algorithm 5.4: RSA PARAMETER GENERATION**

1. Generate two large primes,  $p$  and  $q$ , such that  $p \neq q$
2.  $n \leftarrow pq$  and  $\phi(n) \leftarrow (p-1)(q-1)$
3. Choose a random  $b$  ( $1 < b < \phi(n)$ ) such that  $\gcd(b, \phi(n)) = 1$
4.  $a \leftarrow b^{-1} \pmod{\phi(n)}$
5. The public key is  $(n, b)$  and the private key is  $(p, q, a)$ .

### Cryptosystem 5.1: RSA Cryptosystem

Let  $n = pq$ , where  $p$  and  $q$  are primes. Let  $\mathcal{P} = \mathbb{C} = \mathbb{Z}_n$ , and define

$$\mathcal{K} = \{(n, p, q, a, b) : ab \equiv 1 \pmod{\phi(n)}\}.$$

For  $K = (n, p, q, a, b)$ , define


$$e_K(x) = x^b \pmod{n}$$

and

$$d_K(y) = y^a \pmod{n}$$

$(x, y \in \mathbb{Z}_n)$ . The values  $n$  and  $b$  comprise the public key, and the values  $p, q$  and  $a$  form the private key.

# OAEP padding + RSA



optimal asymmetric encryption padding

#### Cryptosystem 5.4: Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding

Let  $m, k$  be positive integers with  $m < k$ , and let  $k_0 = k - m$ . Let  $\mathcal{F}$  be a family of trapdoor one-way permutations such that  $f : \{0, 1\}^k \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^k$  for all  $f \in \mathcal{F}$ . Let  $G : \{0, 1\}^{k_0} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^m$  and let  $H : \{0, 1\}^m \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{k_0}$  be “random” functions. Define  $\mathcal{P} = \{0, 1\}^m, \mathcal{C} = \{0, 1\}^k$ , and define

$$\mathcal{K} = \{(f, f^{-1}, G, H) : f \in \mathcal{F}\}.$$

For  $K = (f, f^{-1}, G, H)$ , let  $r \in \{0, 1\}^{k_0}$  be chosen randomly, and define

$$e_K(x) = f(y_1 \parallel y_2),$$

where

$$y_1 = x \oplus G(r)$$

and

$$y_2 = r \oplus H(x \oplus G(r)),$$

$x, y_1 \in \{0, 1\}^m, y_2 \in \{0, 1\}^{k_0}$ , and “ $\parallel$ ” denotes concatenation of vectors. Further, define

$$f^{-1}(y) = x_1 \parallel x_2,$$

where  $x_1 \in \{0, 1\}^m$  and  $x_2 \in \{0, 1\}^{k_0}$ . Then define

$$r = x_2 \oplus H(x_1)$$

and

$$d_K(y) = G(r) \oplus x_1.$$

The functions  $f, G$  and  $H$  are the public key; the function  $f^{-1}$  is the private key.

**Algorithm 5.8:** POLLARD  $p - 1$  FACTORING ALGORITHM( $n, B$ )

```
 $a \leftarrow 2$   
for  $j \leftarrow 2$  to  $B$   
  do  $a \leftarrow a^j \bmod n$   
   $d \leftarrow \gcd(a - 1, n)$   
  if  $1 < d < n$   
    then return ( $d$ )  
  else return ("failure")
```

Then it must be the case that

$$(p - 1) \mid B!$$

At the end of the **for** loop, we have that

$$a \equiv 2^{B!} \pmod{n}.$$

Since  $p \mid n$ , it must be the case that

$$a \equiv 2^{B!} \pmod{p}.$$

Now,

$$2^{p-1} \equiv 1 \pmod{p}$$

by Fermat's theorem. Since  $(p - 1) \mid B!$ , it follows that

$$a \equiv 1 \pmod{p},$$

and hence  $p \mid (a - 1)$ .