

1 Question 8.6

Problem

Here is a variation of the *ElGamal Signature Scheme*. The key is constructed in a similar manner as before: Alice chooses $\alpha \in Z_{p^*}$ to be a primitive element, $0 \leq a \leq p - 2$ where $\gcd(a, p - 1) = 1$, and $\beta = \alpha^a \text{ mod } p$. The key $K = (\alpha, a, \beta)$, where α and β are the public key and a is the private key. Let $x \in Z_p$ be a message to be signed. Alice computes the signature $\text{sig}(x) = (\gamma, \delta)$, where

$$\gamma = \alpha^k \text{ mod } p \quad (1)$$

and

$$\delta = (x - k\gamma)a^{-1} \text{ mod } (p - 1) \quad (2)$$

The only difference from the original *ElGamal Signature Scheme* is in the computation of δ . Answer the following questions concerning this modified scheme.

Part A

Describe how a signature (γ, δ) on a message x would be verified using Alice's public key.

Reordering δ :

$$\delta \equiv (x - k\gamma)a^{-1} \text{ mod } (p - 1)$$

$$a\delta \equiv (x - k\gamma) \text{ mod } (p - 1)$$

$$x \equiv (a\delta + k\gamma) \text{ mod } (p - 1)$$

Working backwards:

$$\alpha^x \equiv \alpha^{a\delta + k\gamma} \equiv \alpha^{a\delta} \alpha^{k\gamma} = (\alpha^a)^\delta (\alpha^k)^\gamma \equiv \beta^\delta \gamma^\gamma \text{ (mod } p)$$

$$\text{ver}_K(x, (\gamma, \delta)) = \text{true} \iff \alpha^x \equiv \beta^\delta \gamma^\gamma \text{ (mod } p)$$

Since α , β , and p are part of Alice's public key, we can prove that the message, x , is verified using the public key variables β and p and the signature variables δ and γ .

Part B

Describe a computational advantage of the modified scheme over the original scheme.

(I'm not completely sure on my answer here.)

In the original scheme, one would have to pick a k value that was invertible in $\text{mod } (p - 1)$. In the modified scheme, we are inverting a , a primitive element, which is guaranteed to be invertible in $\text{mod } (p - 1)$. It takes more cycles to find a k that is invertible than it does to just use a , which if chosen correctly does not need to be checked.

Part C

Briefly compare the security of the original and modified scheme.

The security of the modified scheme is less of that of the original scheme.

2 Question 8.7**Problem**

Suppose Alice uses the *DSA* with $q = 101$, $p = 7879$, $\alpha = 170$, $a = 75$, and $\beta = 4567$, as in Example 8.4. Determine Alice's signature on a message x such that $\text{SHA3-224}(x) = 52$, using the random value $k = 49$, and show how the resulting signature is verified.

Solution

Table of known values below:

Variable	Value
q	101
p	7879
α	170
a	75
β	4567
$\text{SHA3} - 224(x)$	52
k	49

Table 1: Table of known values

Finding γ :

$$\gamma = (\alpha^k \bmod p) \bmod q = (170^{49} \bmod 7879) \bmod 101 = 1776 \bmod 101 = 59 \quad (3)$$

Finding δ :

$$\delta = (\text{SHA3} - 224(x) + a\gamma) * k^{-1} \bmod q = (52 + 75 * 59) * 49^{-1} \bmod 101 \quad (4)$$

$$\delta = 33 * (52 + 75 * 59) \bmod 101 = 79 \quad (5)$$

Signature:

$$\text{sig}_K(x, 49) = (59, 79) \quad (6)$$

Verification, finding e_1 :

$$e_1 = \text{SHA3} - 224(x) * \delta^{-1} \bmod q = 52 * 79^{-1} \bmod 101 = 52 * 78 \bmod 101 = 16 \quad (7)$$

Finding e_2 :

$$e_2 = \gamma * \delta^{-1} \text{ mod } q = 59 * 78 \text{ mod } 101 = 57 \quad (8)$$

Verification:

$$\text{ver}_K(x, (59, 79)) = \text{true} \iff (\alpha^{e_1} * \beta^{e_2} \text{ mod } p) \text{ mod } q = \gamma \quad (9)$$

$$(170^{16} * 4567^{57} \text{ mod } 7879) \text{ mod } 101 = 59 \quad (10)$$

$$1776 \text{ mod } 101 = 59 \quad (11)$$

$$59 = 59 \quad (12)$$

3 Question 8.10

Problem

Suppose that $x_0 \in 0, 1^*$ is a bitstring such that $\text{SHA3-224}(x_0) = 00\dots 0$. Therefore, when used in *DSA* or *ECDSA*, we have that $\text{SHA3-224}(x_0) \equiv 0 \text{ mod } q$.

Part A

Show how it is possible to forge a *DSA* signature for the message x_0 . HINT: Let $\delta = \gamma$, where γ is chosen appropriately.

The full *DSA* signature scheme is given below:

$$\gamma = (\alpha^{\text{SHA3-224}(x_0) * \delta^{-1}} * \beta^{\gamma \delta^{-1}} \text{ mod } p) \text{ mod } q$$

It's easy to see that if $\text{SHA3-224}(x) = 0$, then the above equation can reduce to:

$$\gamma = (\beta^{\gamma \delta^{-1}} \text{ mod } p) \text{ mod } q$$

Suppose again that we choose $\delta = \gamma$, then the follow occurs:

$$\gamma = (\beta^{\gamma \gamma^{-1}} \text{ mod } p) \text{ mod } q = (\beta \text{ mod } p) \text{ mod } q = \beta \text{ mod } q$$

Given $\text{SHA3-224}(x_0) = 0$ and $\delta = \gamma$, we can forge signatures with the scheme below:

$$\gamma = \beta \text{ mod } q$$

Since β is public from someone's signature, we can supply the following verification to utilize the scheme we derived above:

$$\text{ver}_K(x_0, (\beta, \beta))$$

Part B

Show how it is possible to forge an *ECDSA* signature for the message x_0 .

We can follow the same process from above for *ECDSA* signatures. Suppose $\text{SHA3} - 224(x) = 0$, then the verification scheme reduces to the following:

$$w = s^{-1} \text{ mod } q$$

$$i = w * \text{SHA3} - 224(x) \text{ mod } q = w * 0 \text{ mod } q = 0$$

$$j = wr \text{ mod } q = s^{-1}r \text{ mod } q$$

$$(u, v) = iA + jB = 0 * A + jB = jB$$

$$\text{ver}_K(x, (r, s)) = \text{true} \iff u \text{ mod } q = r$$

Now suppose we set $r = s$, we can reduce the j variable to 1:

$$j = s^{-1}r \text{ mod } q = s^{-1}s \text{ mod } q = 1$$

Which we can then plug into our (u, v) equation:

$$(u, v) = 1 * B = B$$

Since B is public from the original signature scheme, we can take the x value from B and use it to verify the message, iff the hash of the message is 0:

$$\text{ver}_K(x, (B_x, B_x)) = \text{true}$$

4 Question 8.14**Problem**

Let ε denote the elliptic curve $y^2 \equiv x^3 + x + 26 \text{ mod } 127$. It can be shown that $\#\varepsilon = 131$, which is a prime number. Therefore any non-identity element in ε is a generator for $(\varepsilon, +)$. Suppose the *ECDSA* is implemented in ε , with $A = (2, 6)$ and $m = 54$.

Part A

Compute the public key $B = mA$

$$B = 54 * (2, 6) = (24, 44)$$

Part B

Compute the signature on a message x if $\text{SHA3-224}(x) = 10$, when $k = 75$.

First we must compute kA , or $75 * (2, 6)$:

$$kA = (u, v) = 75 * (2, 6) = (88, 55) \quad (13)$$

Next, we can compute r :

$$r = 88 \text{ mod } 131 = 88 \quad (14)$$

And now s :

$$s = 75^{-1}(10 + 54 * 88) \text{ mod } 131 = 7 * (10 + 54 * 88) \text{ mod } 131 = 60 \quad (15)$$

Our signature:

$$\text{sig}_K(x, 75) = (88, 60) \quad (16)$$

Part C

Show the computations used to verify the signature constructed in part (b).

First we compute w :

$$w = 60^{-1} \text{ mod } 131 = 107 \quad (17)$$

Then we compute i :

$$i = 107 * 10 \text{ mod } 131 = 22 \quad (18)$$

Then we compute j :

$$j = 107 * 88 \text{ mod } 131 = 115 \quad (19)$$

Finally we compute (u, v) :

$$(u, v) = 22 * (2, 6) + 15 * (24, 44) = (88, 55) \quad (20)$$

Our verification:

$$\text{ver}_K(x, (88, 60)) = \text{true} \iff 88 \text{ mod } 131 = 88 \quad (21)$$