The existence of a standard model of ZF is stronger than the assertion of its consistency, but this is not what I mean.
It is impossible to first-order say that there is a standard model of ZF. It goes without saying that every model of ZF+Con(ZF) or ZF+"there is a standard model" could be nonstandard.
When doing consistency proofs with forcing (say, an internally countable forcing notion), it is meaningless to try to extend a countable nonstandard model $M$ to have a standard-countable dense set. But these forcing independence results must follow strictly from ZF. It seems that for this type of forcing we can remedy this by re-indexing our countable dense subset according to the possibly nonstandard $\mathbb{N}^M$, but point notwithstanding (in light of internally-uncountable forcing notions or the subtleties of class forcing, etc):
Always working in a standard model of ZF or its extensions seems awfully reckless. How do I come to accept that we can always do this without giving it a second thought?