Something is perhaps amiss, as the third is certainly a modal validity (in normal alethic modal logics which aim to regiment the notion of necessary truth). Which modal logic are you working in?
(1) holds in any normal modal logic, as any tautology like $(P \to P)$ is a theorem, and necessitations of theorems are theorems.
(2) is an instance of a tautology so is a theorem.
As I say (3) is in most systems (an instance of) a modal axiom, reflecting the truism that if $P$ is necessarily true, then it is plain true. [If the box is read e.g. deontically, as meaning "it ought to be the case that", then the principle obviously fails, as things that ought to be the case aren't always the case. But in a modal logic with the box intended to be read alethically, as meaning "it is necessarily true that" the principle is evidently sound.]
[I'd recommend the opening chapters of Rod Girle, Modal Logics and Philosophy (Acumen 2000, 2009) to anyone starting out on modal logic.]