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all-inOne, section 6.

6.  Authentication Application

6.1.  Kerberos: Info

Info:

6.2.  Basics

--
export of a file system to: host/group/client
--
mount is based on IP address

6.3.  Example: Sun Network File System

Mount Protocol

Use:

ilon% ssh  cs
cs% su -
cs# mount ilon:/export/home/bischof /mnt
cs#

The NFS Protocol

The NFS protocol provides a set of RPCs for remote file operations.

Use of NFS

See also: automount(1m) and automountd(1m).

% cat /etc/auto_master
# Master map for automounter
#
+auto_master
/net            -hosts          -nosuid,nobrowse
/home           auto_home       -nobrowse
/xfn            -xfn
% niscat auto_home.org_dir | grep bischof
bischof altair:/export/home/bischof

6.4.  Services

--
Mounting of FS's
--
Mail
--
ftp
--
Web
--
CPU
--
Qood question; and your answer is?

6.5.  Problems

6.6.  Motivation:

--
Each node assures identify of users and each server relies on this (Wer garantiert das die machinen nicht ausgetauscht werden?)
--
What does ssh guarantee you?
--
The clients authenticate themself to the server and the user identification is up to the client.
--
The user proofs her/his identity to the server and the server proofs his identity to the client

6.7.  Threats

For example:

6.8.  Kerberos

From http://web.mit.edu/kerberos/

Kerberos is a network authentication protocol. It is designed to provide strong authentication for client/server applications by using secret-key cryptography. A free implementation of this protocol is available from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Kerberos is available in many commercial products as well.

6.9.  Kerberos: Provides

6.10.  The Situation

Past:

Without Kerberos:

With Kerberos:

6.11.  Note: Symetric Key Encryption

6.12.  Kerberos: Is (as the paper describes)

What does each requirement entail?

6.13.  Kerberos: Needs

--
private keys are known to kerberos and the client
--
derive keys from passwords
--
generate temporary private keyes
--
generate Session Keys
--
shares a secret key with each server.
--
can be are distributed

6.14.  Credentials

--
good for single server and a single client
--
{s, c, addr, timestamp, life, K{s,c} ) K{s}
--
can only be used once
--
can be created by the client
--
{ c, addr, timestamp ) K{s,c}

6.15.  Kerberos: How it Works

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Abbreviations (from: Kerberos: An Authentication Service for Open Network Systems, Jennifer G. Steiner, Clifford Neuman, Jeffrey I. Schiller)

--
based on private key encryption
--
are used to securely pass the idenity of the person to whom the ticket was issued between the authentication server and the end server
--
a ticket is good for single server and a single client
--
A ticket is used to securly pass the identity of a user
--
A ticket is good for a single server and a user

[equation]

--
authenticator contains information which, when compared against that in the ticket, proves that the client presenting the ticket is the same one to which the ticket was issued.
--
based on private key encryption
--
can only be used once (time stamp)
--
can be generated by the client

[equation]

6.16.  Problem

6.17.  Kerberos: Getting the Initial Ticket

--
which contains the client's name,
--
the name of the ticket-granting server,
--
the current time,
--
a lifetime for the ticket,.
--
the client's IP address,
--
and the random session key just created.
--

Is it possible to learn something by listening to the network?
Nein, denn das Packet ist mit verschluesselt, mit den Schluessel the Klienten, welches nur Kerberos vom password ableitet und dem Klienten bekannt ist.
From:
http://www.scs.stanford.edu/nyu/05sp/sched/readings/kerberos.pdf

6.18.  IS Kerberos?

6.19.  Kerberos: Getting a Server Ticket

--
new random session key used between client and server
--
ticket for the new server
--

6.20.  Kerberos: Requesting a Service

--
Is this realistic?
--
Time allows to keep track

Kerberos Authenticator

[equation]

6.21.  Kerberos: Database

6.22.  Kerberos: Admin

Vieles muss functionieren
--
Skalierbar sicher
--
Ein einziger Punkt der alles aum Stillstand bringen kann

6.23.  Kerberos: Java API

http://www.cs.rit.edu/~hpb/Jdk5/api/javax/security/auth/kerberos/package-summary.html

6.24.  X.509

--
See also rfc320
--
defines specific formats for Public Key Certificates
--
the algorithm that verifies a given certificate path is valid under a give PKI

6.25.  PKI

--
to establish confidentiality,
--
message integrity
--
user authentication.
--
without having to exchange any secret information in advance
--
by using a CA

Example

How can we create a secret key without having met before?

  • We both know a CA
  • I send you

    [equation]

  • you calculate

    [equation]

  • How does this help?

6.26.  Digital Signatures

--
verify author, date and time of signature
--
authenticate content
--
veriviable by a third party

6.27.  X.509 Certificate

Certificate

--
Version
--
Serial Number
--
Algorithm ID
--
Issuer
--
Validity
--
Not Before
--
Not After
--
Subject Subject Public Key Info
--
Public Key Algorithm
--
Subject Public Key
--
Issuer Unique Identifier (Optional)
--
Subject Unique Identifier (Optional)
--
Extensions (Optional)
--
...
--
Certificate Signature Algorithm
--
Certificate Signature
--
User takes unsigned certificate, adds public key, ID
--
Generates Hash Code
--
added to the certificate
--
CA signs certificate with its private key and stores it
--
This can not be forged
--
Decrypted with public key
--
Can be access by anybody to verify users identity

6.28.  Social Networks and Trust

6.29.  How do you know it is your friend?

6.30.  Trust

6.31.  Issues

6.32.  Outlook Trust Models

it is between two users
trust extends from the root
It is a graph - trusr lies in the eye of the beholder

Note: Image from Stalling's book, page 456

6.33.  Addendum

--
cost: $3.2 Billion
--
3.6 million Americans defrauded
--
Articles
--
@inproceedings{ 1073009, author = {Rachna Dhamija and J. D. Tygar}, title = {The battle against phishing: Dynamic Security Skins}, booktitle = {SOUPS '05: Proceedings of the 2005 symposium on Usable privacy and security}, year = {2005}, isbn = {1-59593-178-3}, pages = {77--88}, location = {Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania}, doi = {http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1073001.1073009}, publisher = {ACM Press}, address = {New York, NY, USA}, url = {citeseer.ist.psu.edu/748409.html} } the article
--
@article{1290968, author = {Tom N. Jagatic and Nathaniel A. Johnson and Markus Jakobsson and Filippo Menczer}, title = {Social phishing}, journal = {Commun. ACM}, volume = {50}, number = {10}, year = {2007}, issn = {0001-0782}, pages = {94--100}, doi = {http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1290958.1290968}, publisher = {ACM}, address = {New York, NY, USA}, } Social phishing

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